There is some, but only some, justification for this since, as both Guyer in his introduction and Winkler point out, Kant himself makes use of (a version of) this distinction when he contrasts intellectual philosophers or noologists (Plato and Leibniz) with sensual philosophers (Aristotle, Epicurus, and Locke) or "empirists " (A853/B881-A854/B882 cf. Hogan and Winkler both succeed in illuminating the points of convergence and divergence between Kant and his predecessors, yet I find that there is something of a missed opportunity in the decision to limit the consideration of background to the old opposition between the rationalists and empiricists. This is because empirical concepts are not objectively real without pure concepts that condition the possibility of their objects, and the objective reality of pure concepts cannot be established by an empirical deduction inasmuch as the feeling of necessity traceable to experience is not adequate to the necessity thought in the concept. Instead, Kant claims that a transcendental deduction is necessary to demonstrate the legitimacy of all of our concepts, including empirical ones. On the other hand, the empiricistic backstory to Kant's transcendental deduction is presented in Kenneth Winkler's "Kant, the Empiricists, and the Enterprise of Deduction." Winkler claims that, in spite of taking all concepts to be occasioned by experience, Kant does not fall prey to the temptation of empiricism in taking this to imply that a concept can be derived from experience in a way that completely legitimates its use. According to Hogan, Kant claims that such knowledge is possible (only) with respect to appearances given that we must admit an absolute contingency among things in themselves (on account of Kant's doctrine of freedom), which is just to say that they cannot be known a priori. In his essay, "Kant's Copernican Turn and the Rationalist Tradition," Desmond Hogan argues that, some overlooked continuities notwithstanding, Kant's conception of a priori knowledge as extending to non-analytic necessities represents a fundamental shift from that of the antecedent rationalist tradition. The two essays in Part I consider Kant's Critique in light of the background supplied by the rationalist and empiricist traditions. In what follows I will provide a brief summary of each chapter and limit myself to critical comments on the volume's main sections.
Obviously, a brief review such as this cannot consider each of these essays in detail, nor would commenting on a handful of essays provide much of an understanding of the quality of the entire volume. The CCCPR consists of an introduction (which looks at the development of the Critique during the silent decade and provides an overview of its aims) and 17 essays arranged under three headings: the background, the arguments, and the impact of Kant's first Critique. Like the Companions to Locke's Essay, Hobbes' Leviathan, and Spinoza's Ethics, this volume collects essays by leading scholars on many of the central topics of the work in question.
Critique of pure reason series#
The Cambridge Companion to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason ( CCCPR) is the latest installment in a Companion series devoted to a single philosophical text rather than a philosopher.
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